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We use the implementation of a new prospective payment system (PPS) for inpatient rehabilitation
facilities (IRFs) to investigate the effect of changes in marginal and average reimbursement on costs.
The results show that the IRF PPS led to a significant decline in costs and length of stay. Changes
in marginal reimbursement associated with the move from a cost based system to a PPS led to a 7
to 11% reduction in costs. The elasticity of costs with respect average reimbursement ranged from
0.26 to 0.34. Finally, the IRF PPS had little or no impact on costs in other sites of care, mortality, or
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INTRODUCTION 
Between 1988 and 1997, post-acute care was the fastest growing category of 
Medicare spending with an average annual growth rate of 25% (MedPAC, 2003). The 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and subsequent Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999 
attempted to control the rising spending and costs by shifting payments to providers from a 
cost basis to prospective payment systems (PPSs). However, the switch to a prospective 
payment system has two potential, and possibly competing, effects on costs. First, the switch 
to prospective payment reduces marginal reimbursement for additional services thereby 
creating incentives to reduce costs. Second, and perhaps a less appreciated fact, is that a 
switch to prospective payment could also affect the average reimbursement that a facility 
receives. An increase in average reimbursement levels could in principle lead to an increase 
in costs (Hogkin and McGuire, 1994).  Therefore, it is uncertain whether a switch to 
prospective payment that reduces marginal reimbursement but increases average 
reimbursement would result in cost savings 
Under a prospective payment system that leads to cost savings, the approach chosen 
by providers to reduce costs could have implications for health outcomes.  In particular, cost 
savings that are achieved by reducing the amount of beneficial care provided might increase 
the risk of adverse health outcomes (Cutler, 1995; Shen, 2003). Prospective payment-induced 
reductions in beneficial care could also have spillover effects for providers in other settings; 
for example, patients who are discharged “too early” due to prospective payment and suffer 
adverse health outcomes might end up obtaining additional care from providers in other 
settings.   On the other hand, providers that respond to prospective payment by providing   4 
care more efficiently could generate savings without affecting health outcomes and costs of 
care in other settings.  
In this study, we examine the impact of the inpatient rehabilitation facility 
prospective payment system (IRF PPS) on the costs of care and length of stay in inpatient 
rehabilitation facilities (IRFs).  The IRF PPS changed payments in two fundamental ways. 
First, it switched the payments from a cost-based system to a prospective payment system. 
Second, although the IRF PPS was intended to be budget neutral, we find evidence that in 
practice it significantly increased the average reimbursement received by IRFs. To 
disentangle the impact of changes in marginal and average reimbursement, we take 
advantage of the timing of the IRF PPS and of the fact that different IRFs experienced widely 
divergent degrees of changes in average reimbursement under the new payment system, 
depending on the payment levels they received in the pre-PPS period. We also examine 
whether the IRF PPS had spillover effects on the use of other post-acute and acute care 
providers, and whether it affected health outcomes including return to community residence 
and mortality after an IRF stay.    
We find that the implementation of the IRF PPS was associated with a decline in 
resource use (both costs and length of stay) for patients receiving inpatient rehabilitation 
following a stroke, hip fracture, or lower extremity joint replacement. We also find strong 
evidence that both marginal and average reimbursement matter.  Finally, we find no evidence 
of spillover effects on providers in other settings or adverse health outcomes for patients.   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. First we describe the key features of the 
IRF PPS.  Next, we briefly discuss the anticipated effects of changes in marginal and average   5 
reimbursement associated with the IRF PPS. We then describe our data and empirical 
strategy. The last two sections present the results and conclusions.     
 
THE IRF PPS 
  Prior to the implementation of the IRF PPS, IRFs were paid on a cost basis up to a per 
patient limit that varied substantially across facilities and was based on each facility’s 
historical costs (Chan et al., 1997).  The facility-specific limits were determined by 
calculating average costs per patient during each IRF’s base year of operation: facilities 
opening after this rule went into effect had incentives to inflate their costs during their initial 
period of operation and thus had higher payment limits than older facilities.   Various 
attempts were made to bound the payment limits, for example by imposing caps, but facilities 
were still able to petition to have these caps waived (CMS, 2002).  Accordingly, there was 
wide variation in payment limits: as we describe below, in 2001 approximately a third of 
IRFs had payment limits below $13,000 per patient while the top third had limits above 
$17,000.  The cap in the final year of TEFRA was set at just under $22,000, and 16 IRFs 
successfully made a case to have payment adjustments made that exceeded this cap.  
Under the IRF PPS, IRFs receive a prospective payment for each patient.  Patients are 
assigned to a CMG based on their rehabilitation impairment (e.g., stroke, hip fracture, joint 
replacement, etc.), comorbidities, functional status and length of stay, and each CMG has a 
payment weight based on the expected resource use for patients in that category.  The 
payment for a patient depends on the patient’s CMG and on facility characteristics such as 
rural location and percentage of low-income patients (CMS, 2001; Carter et al., 2004).  A   6 
national conversion factor is used to obtain the dollar amount of the payment.  There is also 
an outlier payment system, but it is designed to affect only three percent of payments.  
  Beginning in January 2002, all IRFs were required to start administering the IRF 
Patient Assessment Instrument (IRF PAI), which is used to assess functional status for the 
purpose of CMG assignment.  However, each IRF actually transitioned to the IRF PPS at the 
beginning of its fiscal year, which could occur any time during the 2002 calendar year. Thus 
some IRFs had more time to anticipate and plan for the transition to the IRF PPS.  In 
summary, all facilities expected a virtual elimination of marginal reimbursement following 
the implementation of the IRF PPS in January 2002. However, the effects of the IRF PPS on 
average reimbursement varied across facilities. Facilities with low pre-PPS annual payment 
limits expected the highest increase in average reimbursement and facilities with high pre-
PPS annual payment limits expected little or no change in average reimbursement. 
 
EXPECTED IMPACT OF THE IRF PPS 
Changes in both marginal and average reimbursement could have significant effects on 
provider behavior. Hodgkin and McGuire (1994) develop a model of how hospitals’ intensity 
of treatment responds to changes in average and marginal reimbursement. Increasing 
intensity of treatment (akin to increases in quality of care) attracts new patients to the 
hospital but also increases the marginal costs of providing care. They consider two types of 
hospitals -- a pure profit-maximizer and a hospital that derives utility from both profits and 
intensity of care. They show that whether or not a hospital is a pure profit-maximizer, it 
responds to increase in marginal and average payment by increasing the intensity of care.  
The intuition is that increasing average reimbursement increases intensity because hospitals   7 
want to attract and admit profitable new patients. Similarly, increasing marginal 
reimbursement makes increases in intensity less costly as hospitals recover some of the costs 
with increased payments. Ellis and McGuire (1996) show that in addition to changing the 
intensity of treatment hospitals might also change the severity or type of patients they see 
(selection effect). The changes in treatment intensity could also affect patient outcomes and 
have spillover effects on providers who provide similar services. For example, patients 
discharged “too early” due to payment change at a particular provider might be at higher risk 
of suffering adverse health outcomes and also might end up obtaining care from providers in 
other settings who provide similar services.  Again, however, providers could respond to 
prospective payment by providing care more efficiently and thus not affect health outcomes 
or costs of care in other settings.  
Several papers have estimated the impact of changes in reimbursement such as the 
switch to acute care PPS in 1983 on hospital costs and selection (See Frank and McGuire, 
2000 for a review).  However, the health economics literature on the impact of PPS on 
patient outcomes is more limited (some prominent exceptions are Staiger and Gaumer, 1992; 
Cutler, 1995; Shen, 2003). Finally, we know of no study that evaluated the spillover effects 
of payment system changes on providers in other settings.    
This study adds to this literature by disentangling the impact of changes in average 
and marginal reimbursement for inpatient rehabilitation care. We evaluate the impact of 
changes in average and marginal payments on intensity of care (costs and length of stay per 
episode), patient characteristics, patient outcomes (mortality and return to community 
residence) and spillover effects for acute care and other post acute care providers. Based on 
the above literature we hypothesize that the impact of the implementation of the IRF PPS   8 
would depend on how the IRF PPS affected the average and marginal reimbursement for 
each facility. The decrease in marginal reimbursement after the implementation of the IRF 
PPS would tend to reduce costs of IRF care and also might increase adverse health outcomes 
and the amount of services consumed after IRF care. This change in IRF costs, outcomes and 
amount of post IRF care services would be mitigated by an increase in average 
reimbursement.   In other words, the decreases in IRF costs and increase in adverse health 
outcomes and post-IRF costs would be greatest for IRFs that experienced the least increase in 
average reimbursement under the IRF PPS and smallest for IRFs that experienced the 
greatest increase in average reimbursement.  
   
METHODS 
Data and Study Sample 
We examined episodes of IRF care for three groups of Medicare patients discharged 
from acute care hospitals between January 1, 2001 and June 30, 2003 and admitted to IRFs 
within 30 days of their acute care discharge: stroke patients; hip fracture patients; and lower 
extremity joint replacement patients.  These 3 impairments account for roughly half of 
admissions to IRFs and represent the 3 largest groups of patients using inpatient 
rehabilitation.   
We used a 100% sample of Medicare acute care hospital claims for the study period 
to identify stroke patients as those with a principal diagnosis of intracerebral hemorrhage 
(diagnosis code 431.xx), occlusion and stenosis of precerebral arteries with infarction 
(433.x1), occlusion of cerebral arteries with infarction (434.x1), or acute but ill-defined 
cerebrovascular disease (436.xx).  We identified hip fracture patients using principal   9 
diagnoses of fractures of the neck of the femur (820.xx).  Hip fracture patients whose 
fractures could be due to bone metastases or who suffered major trauma to a site other than a 
lower extremity were excluded.  We identified lower extremity joint replacement patients 
using the diagnosis related groups for joint replacement procedures, but excluding patients 
classified above as hip fracture patients and those with reattachment procedures (procedure 
codes 84.26, 84.27 and 84.28.)   
We then linked a 100% sample of Medicare cost report, enrollment and claims data 
for acute care hospitals, IRFs, skilled nursing facilities and home health care so we could 
identify patients who used inpatient rehabilitation; construct episodes of IRF care (see 
below); and assess costs, length of stay, and Medicare payments for services used in acute 
and post-acute care settings during an episode.
1   We also linked these data with the 
Minimum Data Set (MDS) data on the universe of nursing home stays to ascertain whether 
each study patient was in a custodial nursing home before or at the end of the IRF episode. 
We excluded a small fraction of patients from our analyses.  Patients who died in the 
acute care hospital or within 30 days of hospital discharge were dropped since their use of 
post-acute care was effectively truncated. We also dropped patients admitted to IRFs that did 
not treat any patients in the pre-PPS period (i.e., 2001), patients who were residents of 
nursing homes prior to their acute admission since they would not be expected to return to 
community residence, and patients for whom Medicare was not the primary payer for their 
acute care stay since we likely lacked complete information on their use of care.  
The final analysis sample consisted of 108,692 patients with episodes of IRF care 
following a stroke; 92,142 following a hip fracture; and 229,705 following a lower extremity 
                                                 
1 Records were linked across these administrative databases using the patients’ unique scrambled social security 
number and provider ID numbers.    10 
joint replacement.  These patients were admitted to 1,145 different IRFs; 38% of these IRFs 
transitioned to the IRF PPS in the first quarter of 2002, 9% in the second quarter, 37% in the 
third quarter, and 16% in the fourth quarter.  
Episodes of IRF Care and Study Outcomes  
For each patient in the study sample, we constructed an episode of IRF care that 
began with admission to an IRF facility and ended 60 days after admission to IRF. (The 
results were qualitatively similar with episodes of 90 days.) We obtained the costs of the 
initial IRF stay in each episode as follows.  First, we used claims data to determine the 
charges incurred in each department within the IRF.  Next, we estimated the costs incurred 
by multiplying the charges for each department by the cost-to-charge ratio for the 
department, obtained from Medicare cost reports and then summed the departmental costs to 
obtain total costs.  We also used claims data to obtain the length of the initial IRF stay in 
each episode. Details of the cost calculation are available in Carter et al. (2002). 
We also calculated Medicare payments for each IRF stay.  For stays in 2001 (the pre-
PPS period), we calculated payments by multiplying the cost of the episode by a facility-
specific payment-to-cost ratio, estimated using data on costs and Medicare payments from 
the cost reports. Payments for stays under the IRF PPS were determined by using the IRF 
PPS rules to simulate payments.  Specifically, we classified each IRF patient into a CMG 
based on their impairment group and functional status reported at admission to the IRF, used 
the payment weight for each CMG and the published conversion factor to calculate the base 
payment, multiplied the base payment by a facility-level adjustment based on the 
characteristics of the IRF, and adjusted payments for unusual cases including short stay 
transfers and outliers (Carter et al., 2002).   11 
For each 60-day IRF episode, we used claims to calculate Medicare payments for care 
received in other settings including readmissions to acute care hospitals, SNFs, long-term 
care hospitals, and home health care.  
Finally, we used the Medicare and MDS data to identify each patient’s clinical 
outcome at the end of the IRF episode, i.e., 60 days after admission to IRF.  We classified 
patients into two categories: (1) returning to the community (i.e., alive and receiving no 
institutional care) or (2) dead or institutionalized (i.e. staying in an acute care hospital or 
post-acute care facility (IRF, SNF, or long-term care hospital), staying in a custodial nursing 
home, or dead). 
Empirical Methods 
For all analyses, we defined the pre-PPS period as the four calendar quarters from 
January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2001 and the post-PPS period as the 10 quarters from 
January 1, 2002 through June 30, 2003.  In several analyses, we also classified IRFs into one 
of three mutually exclusive categories, with a roughly equal number of facilities in each 
category, based on their annual payment limit in pre-PPS period: payment limit less than 
$13,000; payment limit between $13,000 and $16,999; and payment limit greater than or 
equal to $17,000. Facilities in the lowest pre-PPS payment category experienced the highest 
increase in average reimbursement as a result of the PPS. 
We conducted descriptive analyses to compare costs, length of stay and payments for 
IRF care in the pre-PPS and post-PPS periods.  We also estimated two different sets of 
multivariate regression models to examine changes in the level and rate of growth of costs 
and length of stay between the pre-PPS and post-PPS periods.  The multivariate analyses 
allow us to examine the drivers of changes in costs and length of stay while controlling for   12 
patient and IRF characteristics. To account for the skewed distributions of costs and length of 
stay, we logarithmically transformed these variables for the analyses.  We conducted separate 
analyses for each tracer condition (hip fracture, joint replacement and stroke). 
In the first set of regression models, we examined the percentage change in average 
IRF costs (or length of stay) between the pre-PPS and post-PPS period controlling for patient 
and IRF characteristics and a pre-existing quarterly time trend.  Thus, in these models the key 
independent variable was an indicator variable for the post-PPS period, and the coefficient on 
this variable measures the percentage change in costs (or length of stay) between the pre-PPS 
and post-PPS period.
2  Using the three categories of facilities that we defined based on pre-
PPS payment limits (see above), we tested whether decreases in costs and length of stay 
following implementation of the IRF PPS were greatest for IRFs that experienced the lowest 
increase in average reimbursement under the PPS and smallest for IRFs that experienced the 
highest increase in average reimbursement. 
In the second set of regression models, we use instrumental variables (IV) estimation 
to disentangle the impact of changes in average and marginal reimbursement on costs. We 
estimate the following IV model using two-stage least squares.  
( ) * * * * PPS pre f Log AveragePayment PPS paylimit PPS X a d d d q h = + + + + +   (1) 
                                                 
2 The analysis described above measured the impact of the IRF PPS on cost (or length of stay) by 
allowing for a break in the level of costs in the first quarter of 2002. We tested the robustness of our results by 
estimating models that assessed changes in growth rates and levels at two time points:  (1) the first quarter of 
2002, when all IRFs began administering the IRF PAI and could anticipate transitioning to the IRF PPS, and (2) 
the beginning of the fiscal year for each facility, when the IRF PPS was actually in effect.  The results of this 
more complex model were similar to the results from the simpler model reported in the paper. In particular, 
consistent with the results reported in the paper, we found statistically significant declines in the levels and 
growth of costs for patients in all 3 study impairments. Moreover, most of the decrease in costs was 
“anticipatory” in that it occurred in the first quarter of 2002.  This “anticipatory” decline is costs is also 
confirmed by Figures 1 and 2 which show a substantial and immediate dip in the level of costs and length of 
stay in first quarter of 2002. Complete results from this more complex specification are omitted in the interest of 
brevity. 
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^
* * ( ) * PPS avg f Y PPS Log AveragePayment X a b b b l e = + + + + +   (2) 
where, AveragePayment measures average reimbursement; PPS is an indicator variable 
indicating whether the data are from the post-PPS period; paylimit is the pre-PPS payment 
limit; X is a vector of covariates that includes a linear time trend and patient characteristics 
(described in detail later); and Y is the outcome of interest (log costs).  f q and  f l are facility 
fixed effects; they control for any systematic differences across IRFs including their pre-PPS 
payment limits and other facility-specific characteristics.   
Several points are noteworthy. First, following the implementation of the IRF PPS all 
facilities experienced an arguably exogenous and identical change in marginal 
reimbursement; specifically, marginal reimbursement was driven down to zero as all 
facilities were paid prospectively following the IRF PPS. Therefore,  PPS b  identifies the 
causal effect of reducing marginal reimbursement to zero.  In addition, following the IRF 
PPS all facilities also experienced a change in average reimbursement. However, the 
magnitude of the change in average reimbursement was not identical across facilities; rather, 
it depended on the pre-PPS payment limit. Thus,  * paylimit PPS  is a valid instrument for 
average payment as it is driven by exogenous changes in average reimbursement introduced 
by the IRF PPS and it is a strong predictor of average reimbursement (as we’ll show in the 
results). Therefore,  avg b  measures the elasticity of costs or length of stay with respect to 
average reimbursement. Finally, note that the above model includes facility level fixed 
effects and a rich set of demographic and patient characteristics that we describe next.   
The individual or patient level covariates in the regression models included the 
patient’s age, gender, race, and location of residence (categorized as a metropolitan county, a   14 
county adjacent to a metropolitan area, or county not adjacent to a metropolitan area).  The 
models also included a large set of clinical variables tailored to our stroke, hip fracture, and 
joint replacement patients intended to control for the severity of each patient at discharge 
from the acute care hospital.  The clinical variables included the following 13 chronic 
comorbidities:  primary cancer with poor prognosis, metastatic cancer, chronic pulmonary 
disease, coronary artery disease, congestive heart failure, peripheral vascular disease, severe 
chronic liver disease, diabetes mellitus with and without end-organ damage, chronic renal 
failure, nutritional deficiencies, dementia, and functional impairment (Iezzoni et al., 1994; 
Buntin et al., 2005) 
The clinical variables also included 21 types of complications that were likely to have 
arisen during the acute stay, be important for a Medicare population, and have a continued 
effect after acute care discharge:  pulmonary compromise; post-operative gastrointestinal 
hemorrhage; cellulitis or decubitus ulcer; septicemia; pneumonia; mechanical complications 
due to a device; implant, or graft; shock or cardiorespiratory arrest in the hospital; post-
operative acute myocardial infarction (AMI); post-operative cardiac abnormalities other than 
AMI; post-operative derangement; coma; procedure-related perforation or laceration; venous 
thrombosis and pulmonary embolism; wound infection; acute renal failure; delirium; sentinel 
events; iatrogenic complications; stroke (for joint replacement and hip fracture patients only); 
hip fracture (for stroke patients only); and other miscellaneous complications (Iezzoni et al., 
1994; Buntin et al., 2005). 
We also created several condition-specific clinical variables.  For hip fracture and 
joint replacement patients, we created indicators of the type of surgical procedure the patient 
received.  Hip fracture patients were classified as having no surgery, internal fixation, a   15 
partial or total hip replacement, and/or a revision of a previous joint replacement.  We also 
classified the location of the fracture. For joint replacement patients, we created indicators 
for hip or knee replacement, and for whether the patient received multiple replacements.  For 
stroke patients, we created indicators for hemorrhagic stroke and for variants of ischemic 
stroke. 
Finally, the regression models included an indicator for each IRF (i.e., a facility 




There was a substantial increase in average payments to IRFs, ranging from 18% for 
joint replacement patients to 23% for stroke patients, following implementation of the IRF 
PPS (p<.01) (Table 1).  However, there was variation in the magnitude of increase in average 
payments in the pre-PPS period: IRFs with the lowest pre-PPS payment limits experienced 
the highest increases in average payments under the IRF PPS, whereas IRFs with the highest 
limits experienced the lowest increase in payments.  This difference in the change in average 
payments was statistically significant (p <0.01) and is consistent with the notion that IRFs 
with the highest payment limits experienced the most financial pressure under the IRF PPS. 
Table 2 compares mean costs and length of stay for IRF admissions in the pre-PPS 
and post-PPS periods.  There was a small but statistically significant increase in costs for 
joint replacement and hip fracture patients (p<.01). Mean length of stay for the initial IRF    16 
stay decreased by 5% to 6% for patients with all 3 study impairments (p<.01).
3  Finally, the 
data show that mean Medicare payments for acute or post acute care after the initial IRF 
admission increased by 6% to 9% across the 3 study impairments. There was no statistically 
significant change in rates of return to residing in the community 60 days after the initial IRF 
admission.  
Table 3 shows a remarkable similarity in the patient population before and after the 
IRF PPS. The distribution of IRF patients according to age, gender, race, Medicaid status, 
and location of residence did not change significantly after the IRF PPS was implemented.  
Moreover, the changes in the clinical variables were minor and did not exhibit any pattern 
suggesting a significant change in the severity or complexity of IRF patients.
4 
 
Mean IRF Costs and Length of Stay Before and After the IRF PPS 
Figures 1 and 2 show trends in mean costs and length of stay for the period January 1, 
2001 through June 30, 2003.  The trends in the raw data are striking.  As shown in Figures 1 
and 2, mean IRF costs and length of stay per patient were rising rapidly in the pre-PPS period 
in all IRFs and for all 3 study impairments.  However, there was a substantial and immediate 
decline in the level of costs and length of stay beginning in the first quarter of 2002 following 
the IRF PPS. It also shows that facilities with “low” (< $13,000) pre-PPS payment limits 
                                                 
3 The sharp decrease in length of stay but negligible increase in costs is most likely explained by rising input 
prices. We estimate that input prices actually increased by 4.8% between the pre-PPS and post-PPS period: 
we calculated the input price increase by using CMS’s quarterly moving averages from Q1:2001 through 
Q2:2003 for the market basket inputs used by inpatient rehabilitation facilities. Since the actual increase in 
payments was lower than 4.8%, and length of stay declined, this suggests that real resource use per discharge 
declined following the implementation of the IRF PPS – a finding also confirmed by multivariate results.  
4 We also observed a remarkable similarity in patient population before and after IRF PPS even when facilities 
were classified according to their pre-PPS payment limit: payment limit less than $13,000; payment limit 
between $13,000 and $16,999; and payment limit greater than or equal to $17,000.   17 
experienced a smaller decline in costs and length of stay compared to facilities with “high” 
(>$17,000) pre-PPS payment limits.  
 Table 4 shows the results from the first set of regressions. The results show the 
percentage change in IRF costs and lengths of stay after the implementation of the IRF PPS, 
adjusted for a pre-existing time trend (constant growth rate), changes in patient 
characteristics and changes in characteristics of IRFs, by the pre-PPS payment limit 
categories.  Notably, IRFs with the lowest pre-PPS limits experienced the smallest decrease 
in costs for the initial IRF stay under the IRF PPS.  Thus, the mean costs of treating stroke, 
hip fracture, and joint replacement patients fell by 6.2% (p<.01), 2.7% (p<.01), and 2.6% 
(p<.01), respectively, in IRFs with payment limits less than $13,000 after the IRF PPS was 
implemented.  By contrast, the costs of treating stroke, hip fracture, and joint replacement 
patients fell by 9% (p<0.01), 6.8% (p<0.01), and 6.3% (p< 0.01), respectively, in IRFs with 
the highest pre-PPS limits. For all 3 study conditions, the change in costs experienced by 
IRFs with the highest payment limit was significantly different (p<.05) from the change in 
costs experienced by IRFs with the lowest payment limit.    
The bottom panel of Table 4 presents results from our multivariate analysis of length 
of stay. The results are consistent with the cost results and show that length of stay declined 
following the implementation of the IRF PPS. The results also confirm our previous finding 
of a positive association between changes in payments and costs. Consistent with results for 
costs we find that facilities in the lowest payment category (that experienced the highest 
increase in payments) experienced the smallest decrease in length of stay. In IRFs with the 
lowest payment limits the mean length of stay for stroke, hip fracture, and joint replacement 
patients fell by 8% (p<.01), 4.5% (p<.01), and 3.2% (p<.01), respectively, after the IRF PPS   18 
was implemented.  However, the drop in mean length of stay was even greater in IRFs with 
the highest payment limits:  9.8% for stroke (p<.01), 7.5% for hip fracture (p<.01), and 5.6% 
for joint replacement (p<.01).  
In summary, the findings from both the raw data and the costs and length of stay 
regressions strongly suggest that resource use declined following the implementation of the 
IRF PPS and the decline in resource use was lesser in facilities that experienced the highest 
increase in average reimbursement. In other words, the results suggest that both marginal and 
average reimbursements matter—the elimination of marginal reimbursement (marginal 
reimbursement is zero under the IRF PPS) led to a decline in costs and length of stay, 
however, this decline in resource use was mitigated by the increase in average reimbursement 
following the IRF PPS.  
Table 5 shows the results from the instrumental variable (IV) regressions that 
disentangle the impact of changes in average and marginal reimbursement on costs per 
discharge.  The coefficient on the PPS variable measures the causal effect of reducing 
marginal reimbursement to zero. The coefficient on Log(Avg. Payment) measures the 
elasticity of costs with respect to average reimbursement or payment. In addition, we report 
the first stage F-Statistic for  * paylimit PPS . 
The first stage F-statistics reported in Table 5 shows that our instrument is very strong 
predictor of changes in average reimbursement. In other words, these results confirm that the 
magnitude of the change in average reimbursement following IRF PPS was not identical 
across facilities and depended critically on the pre-PPS payment limit. Thus,  * paylimit PPS  
is a valid instrument for average payment as it is driven by exogenous changes in average   19 
reimbursement introduced by the IRF PPS and it is a strong predictor of average 
reimbursement.  
The results in Table 5 show that cost per discharge for stroke, hip fracture, and joint 
replacement patients fell by 11% (p<.01), 8% (p<.01), and 7% (p<.01), respectively, due to 
the decrease in marginal reimbursement following IRF PPS. The table also shows that costs 
also respond to changes in average reimbursement – a 100% increase in average 
reimbursement for stroke, hip fracture, and joint replacement patients would increase costs 
by 26%(p<.01), 34%(p<.01), and 28%(p<.01), respectively.  
Spillover Effects and Outcomes 
  Mean Medicare payments for acute and post-acute care services received after IRF 
discharge increased by 5 to 7 percent after the IRF PPS was implemented for all 3 study 
impairments (Table 6).  However, there was no clear relationship between IRFs’ annual 
payment limits in the pre-PPS period and cost spillovers to other providers. For all 3 study 
conditions the change in mean Medicare payments following IRF PPS was not statistically 
different between facilities with high (> 17,000) and low (< 13,000) pre-PPS annual payment 
limits. These results were conformed in the multivariate analysis that controlled for a pre-
existing time trend, patient characteristics and facility fixed effects (results not shown in 
table).  In addition, there was no meaningful change in the use of post-IRF care as measured 
numbers of days in an acute care or post acute care facility following the initial IRF 
admission.  Thus, the small increase in post IRF payments following the implementation of 
the IRF PPS most likely reflects Medicare’s annual increases in payment rates (to account for 
input price inflation) rather than changes in resource use.     20 
Table 6 also shows that the changes in costs and length of stay following the 
implementation of the IRF PPS had little or no impact on the rate of return to community 60 
days after the initial IRF admission. We also found no changes in mortality rates following 
IRF PPS and no evidence of differential impact on outcomes based on a facilities pre-PPS 
payment limit. Finally, the results from multivariate analyses of outcomes were consistent 
with results in Table 6 (results not presented).   
CONCLUSIONS 
We used the implementation of a new prospective payment system for inpatient 
rehabilitation facilities to investigate the effect of changes in marginal and average 
reimbursement on costs and length of stay. The results show that the IRF PPS led to a 
significant decline in costs and length of stay. Changes in marginal reimbursement associated 
with the move from a cost based system to a PPS led to a 7 to 11% reduction in costs across 
the three conditions that we studied. The elasticity of costs with respect average 
reimbursement ranged from 0.26 to 0.34.  
The evidence for a causal effect of the IRF PPS on these outcomes is two-fold.  First, 
we observed sizable declines in the levels and growth rates of costs and length of stay 
directly coinciding with the beginning of the transition to the new payment system in January 
2002.  Second, the decreases in costs and length of stay were greatest for IRFs that 
experienced the smallest increase in average reimbursement under the IRF PPS, and lowest 
for IRFs that experienced the most increase in average reimbursement.  This is consistent 
with more pronounced responses among facilities experiencing the strongest incentives to 
curb resource use. In addition, we did not find evidence of a change in the types of patients 
receiving inpatient rehabilitation following the implementation of the IRF PPS—a  finding   21 
supported by another study using more detailed clinical data and measures of functional 
status (Carter and Paddock, 2004). 
The reductions in resources devoted to IRF patients raise questions about spillover 
effects on other providers and outcomes.  However, we found that implementation of the IRF 
PPS did not coincide with a change in resource use at other acute and post-acute care 
providers during the 60 days following a patient’s admission to an IRF.  Moreover, in 
contrast to the findings for IRF costs and length of stay, we found no evidence that changes 
in Medicare payments to other acute and post acute care providers were related to the degree 
of financial pressure faced by IRFs. Finally, we found that the changes in resource use 
following the implementation of the IRF PPS had little or no impact on patient outcomes as 
measured by mortality rates and rates of return to residence in the community 60 days 
following IRF admission.  The implication of these findings is that, when given incentives to 
do so, IRFs were able to improve their efficiency, producing similar outcomes for similar 
patients but using fewer resources and days of care.   
It is important in evaluating these findings to understand the limitations and context 
of this study. First, this study examines IRF costs, length of stay, and outcomes for a year-
and-a-half following the implementation of the IRF PPS. The data show a marked decline in 
costs following the implementation of the IRF PPS but continued growth thereafter, albeit at 
slower rates.  It will be important to monitor long-term trends as more data become available.  
We also acknowledge that more sensitive measures of functional status or quality of life 
might have captured changes in outcomes, but such data are not nationally available. 
  Our findings do, however, clearly demonstrate that IRFs responded to both changes 
in average and marginal reimbursement associated with the IRF PPS by reducing their costs   22 
and length of stay consistent with the level of financial pressure they faced.  Fortunately 
these changes do not appear to have had adverse consequences in terms of poor health 
outcomes or increased costs in other facilities.   23 
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Figure 2: Mean IRF Length of Stay (LOS) by Annual Payment Limit and Quarter of 































2001-Q1 2001-Q3 2002-Q1 2002-Q3 2003-Q1 2001-Q1 2001-Q3 2002-Q1 2002-Q3 2003-Q1
2001-Q1 2001-Q3 2002-Q1 2002-Q3 2003-Q1




















Mean IRF LOS by Payment Limit 
  27 
 
Table 1.  IRF Payments by Tracer Condition and Facility Type 
                                   
      Facilities with 2001 Payment Limit of: 
                                   
    < $13,000    $13,000 - $17,000  > $17,000      All Facilities     
                                   
















Change    
IRF 
Payments($)                                   
                                   
Joint 
Replacement    $6465  $8294  28% 
*  $7778  $8843  14% 
*  $8368  $9266  11% 
*  $7435  $8764  18% 
*§ 
                                   
Hip Fracture    $9700  $12951  34% 
*  $11517  $13578  18% 
*  $12557  $14143  13% 
*  $11172  $13530  21% 
*§ 
                                   
Stroke    $12775  $17094  34% 
*  $14887  $17562  18% 
*  $16327  $19441  19% 
*  $14665  $18048  23% 
*§ 
                                   
*Difference between pre-PPS and IRF PPS is significant at P < .01 
§
 percentage change in costs or LOS for IRFs with high pre-PPS limit is statistically different from IRFs with low pre-PPS limit P < .01 
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Table 2.  IRF Costs, Length of Stay and Post IRF Outcomes during the Pre-PPS and IRF PPS Payment Periods       
                           
      Condition Type       
                           
    Joint Replacement    Hip Fracture    Stroke   


















Change    
Costs and LOS                           
                           
IRF Costs ($)    7322  7418  1.3%  *  11030  11207  1.6%  *  14534  14592  0.4%   
Length of Stay for Initial Episode (days)    9.6  9.0  -5.7%  *  14.6  13.9  -4.9%  *  17.9  17.1  -4.7%  * 
                           
Outcomes                           
                           
Total Payments for Post-IRF Care ($)    2852  3021  5.9%  *  5935  6357  7.1%  *  6288  6825  8.6%  * 
Alive In Community 60 days after IRF 
admission (%)     96.8  97.0  0.2%     81.3  81.3  -0.1%     74.6  74.7  0.2%    
*Difference between pre-PPS and IRF PPS is significant at P < .01 
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Table 3.  Patient Characteristics by Condition Type during the Pre-PPS and IRF PPS Payment Periods 
                     
      Condition Type    
                     
    Joint Replacement    Hip Fracture    Stroke   
     
Pre-








PPS    
Demographics                     
Age (years)    73.7  73.5    80.2  80.1    76.0  76.1   
Female (%)    70.7  70.1    75.7  75.5    56.6  56.5   
Hispanic (%)    1.3  1.3    1.4  1.4    1.5  1.7   
African-American (%)    8.0  8.1    4.1  4.0    14.2  14.4   
White (%)    88.5  88.3    92.3  92.3    80.9  80.3   
Receiving Medicaid  Benefits (%)    11.5  11.9    14.7  15.2    19.8  19.9   
MSA (%)    77.4  77.9    77.4  77.5    76.6  77.7   
MSA adjacent (%)    13.3  12.6    12.9  12.5    13.5  12.9   
non-MSA (%)    9.2  9.4    9.7  9.9    9.9  9.4   
                     
Health Status*                     
Comorbid conditions (n)    0.54  0.56    0.91  0.94    1.42  1.42   
Complications (n)    0.15  0.16    0.20  0.21    0.15  0.16   
Any comorbid conditions (%)    40.2  42.0    58.5  59.8    80.9  81.0   
Any complications (%)    11.8  12.3    15.2  16.3    11.6  12.5   
                     
Condition Specific Factors*                     
Partial    1.5  1.3    -  -    -  -   
Revision    5.7  5.0    -  -    -  -   
Total revision    30.3  30.0    -  -    -  -   
Hip replacement    37.5  36.2    -  -    -  -   
Knee replacement    62.6  63.8    -  -    -  -   
Bilateral procedure    6.3  6.1    -  -    -  -   
Petrochanteric fracture    -  -    46.5  46.1    -  -   
Partial    -  -    36.8  37.7    -  -   
Revision    -  -    0.2  0.2    -  -   
Total replacement    -  -    3.9  3.9    -  -   
Hemorrhagic stroke (%)    -  -    -  -    9.6  9.6   
Basilar artery infraction (%)    -  -    -  -    0.4  0.5   
Carotid, vertebral, or multiple 
artery (%) 
   -  -     -  -     6.0  5.8    
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Table 3.  Patient Characteristics by Condition Type during the Pre-PPS and IRF PPS 
Payment Periods (cont.) 
 
*Health status and condition specific factors are based on information coded in the preceding 
acute care claim. 
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Table 4: Percentage Change in Costs and Length of Stay following IRF PPS by condition 
and facility type. 
  Facilities with 2001 Pre-PPS Limit of: 
  < $13,000    $13,000 - $17,000    > $17,000   
             
Costs             
Joint Replacement  -2.6% 
***  -4.4% 
***  -6.3% 
***§ 
             
Hip Fracture  -2.7% 
***  -5.3% 
***  -6.8% 
***§ 
             
Stroke  -6.2% 
***  -8.7% 
***  -9.0% 
***§ 
Length of Stay   
   
   
 
Joint Replacement  -3.2% 
***  -4.7% 
***  -5.6% 
***§ 
             
Hip Fracture  -4.5% 
***  -6.0% 
***  -7.5% 
***§ 
             
Stroke  -8.0% 
***  -10.5% 
***  -9.8% 
***# 
               
(*, **, ***) Difference between pre-PPS and IRF PPS is significant at P < (.10, .05, .01) 
§
 percentage change in costs or LOS for IRFs with high pre-PPS limit is statistically different from IRFs with low pre-PPS limit at P < .05    
# percentage change in costs or LOS for IRFs with high pre-PPS limit is statistically different from IRFs with low pre-PPS limit at P < .10 
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Table 5: Effects of Marginal and Average Reimbursement on Costs 
  Conditions 
 
Joint 
Replacement    Hip Fracture    Stroke   
             
Log(Costs)             
PPS  -0.07 
***  -0.08 
***  -0.11 
*** 
             
Log(Avg. Payment)  0.28 
***  0.34 
***  0.26 
*** 
             
First Stage F-statistic  877.34 
***  453.26 
***  202.49 
*** 
 
(*, **, ***) significant at P < (.10, .05, .01) 
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Table 6.  Changes in Outcomes and Medicare Payments for Other Acute and Post-acute Care Services 
                           
      Facilities with Pre-PPS Limit of:       
                           
    < $13,000  $13,000 - $17,000  > $17,000   
                           


















Change    
                           
Joint Replacement                           
Total Payments for Post IRF Care    2735  2916  6.6%  *  2817  2990  6.1%  *  3035  3177  4.7%  * 
Alive In Community 60 days after IRF 
admission (%)    97.0  97.0  0.1%    96.9  96.9  0.0%    96.7  96.8  0.1%   
                           
Hip Fracture                           
Total Payments for Post IRF Care    5774  6204  7.5%  *  6063  6328  4.4%  *  6004  6556  9.2%  * 
Alive In Community 60 days after IRF 
admission (%)    81.8  81.7  -0.2%    80.4  80.4  -0.1%    81.5  81.6  0.1%   
                           
Stroke                           
Total Payments for Post IRF Care    5898  6487  10.0%  *  6337  6911  9.1%  *  6628  7077  6.8%  * 
Alive In Community 60 days after IRF 
admission (%)     75.2  75.3  0.1%     73.4  73.6  0.3%     75.1  75.3  0.2%    
*Difference between pre-PPS and IRF PPS is significant at P < .01 
 
             